Tuesday, 29 January 2013

Medical Marijuana: the Future


Matthew Got
McMaster University

On December 16, 2012, the Canadian government rolled out yet another policy that was aimed at “improving public safety and maintaining patient access.” Similar catch phrases have been used time and time again, and if anything is to be learned, it is that the government is not telling the whole story. A quick read through Health Canada’s press release reveals that the Medical Marijuana Access Program (MMAP) will be no more— their justification is that the “current medical marijuana regulations have left the system open to abuse.”


Currently, the MMAP operates by either granting patients a license to grow marijuana in their homes, or by allowing them to purchase marijuana grown and distributed by the government for medical use. Patients who chose to purchase from Health Canada are charged $5 per gram, a price heavily subsidized by taxpayers. The size of the MMAP has grown from under 500 authorized patients at its inception in 2002, to over 26,000 patients today. With the proposed changes, the government will no longer grant permission to grow marijuana nor produce marijuana themselves. Instead, the market will be open to companies that meet strict security requirements.

Health Canada intends to treat marijuana like they treat other narcotics used for medical purposes. Under the new system, healthcare practitioners would sign a medical document allowing the patient to purchase an appropriate amount of marijuana from the new vendors. With this new system, Health Canada believes there will be greater quality control of the marijuana and that it will be harder to acquire excessive amounts. The changes have garnered applause from both the Association of Fire Chiefs and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police for addressing the unintended impact of the MMAP on public safety, specifically fire hazards and criminal activity. 

The inconvenient truth is that this policy is neither primarily about public safety nor maintaining patient access. Most strikingly, this policy screams of health cuts, as the government will no longer be subsidizing patients when they purchase their marijuana. As private entities will be given the rights to marijuana production and distribution, this industry will become increasingly dominated by big pharmaceuticals, driving up the marijuana prices and jeopardizing access for low-income patients.

Following the changes, MMAP patients who are now no longer permitted to grow their own marijuana or purchase at a discounted price are left with few options. Those who cannot afford to purchase at the prices set by industry will be left without treatment, forced to continue growing but now illegally or forced to purchase illicitly. If they choose to fix this problem, they will be forced to increase social payments to these patients, undermining their original motive for ending the MMAP.

If improving public safety were really a main focus of this latest policy, reforming the MMAP would have been an appropriate move. The current program has a major loophole that has been widely acknowledge but has not been corrected—the production licenses issued do not regulate the amount of electricity used by the patients to grow their marijuana. Since marijuana production is proportional to the total wattage used, simply regulating the wattage per license would limit the amount of marijuana produced by each patient. This would prevent abuse of the production licenses while addressing many safety issues.

The government has been presented with a great opportunity to improve the MMAP for patients. Instead, as the program has gotten bigger and with more patients relying on it, they intend to back out and surrender the program to the private sector. Understandably, there are people currently enrolled in the system that abuse it. However, the appropriate action would be to reform the system so that it is harder to manipulate as in addition to making it safer and more accessible for patients. 


References

The Denial of Education: Religious Persecution of the Bahá'í Community in Iran

Campus Association for Bahá'í Studies
Queen's University

In an age when the promotion and protection of human rights and security are regarded as measures of societal progress, violations of the basic rights of individuals are met with considerable opposition. State and non-state actors alike have attempted to counteract global human rights violations— yet cases of religious, ethnic and cultural persecution continue to persist. In 1863, the Bahá'í Faith was founded by the Prophet Bahá'u'lláh in Iran. Since the inception of the Bahá'í faith, the various regimes that have governed Iran have systemically persecuted members of the Bahá'í community and pursued attempts to extinguish the faith at large. 

Although it is a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Islamic Republic of Iran is among the most severe perpetrators of human rights violations internationally. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the persecution of the Bahá'ís intensified; mass arrests and the execution of hundreds marked the new regime's stance on the Bahá'í Faith in Iran. The government undertook efforts to institutionalize their campaign of religious persecution including the barring of Bahá'í students and faculty from studying or teaching at universities. In 1987, the Iranian Bahá'í community responded to the expulsion of its students and faculty by establishing the Bahá'í Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). BIHE provides those students who had been deprived of education by state officials a chance to continue their undergraduate and graduate studies. The Institute was, and still is semi-clandestine, operating outside of the public sphere.  

A 1991 memorandum known as the "Bahá'í Question", signed by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calls for the Bahá'ís to be treated in such a way that "their progress and development are blocked". The denial of education for any individuals who self identify as Bahá'í is a central tenet of this plan. Although discretion has been essential to the survival of BIHE, the Iranian government has carried out a campaign to shut it down. For years, government forces have been launching raids, confiscating equipment and arresting individuals associated with the institute. In 1998, 500 homes, in which BIHE classes were held, were raided; confiscating equipment, books, computers, and arresting thirty-six faculty members. Further raids were carried in 2001 and 2003. 

In recent years, as part of the campaign to deny the Bahá'ís access to education, and ultimately eradicate the faith, there has been a revival in the attacks against BIHE. A 2006 letter from Iran's Ministry of Science, Research and Technology instructed Iranian universities to expel any students discovered to be Bahá'ís. There is significant evidence to demonstrate that this directive from the Ministry was heeded by university officials as more than half of Bahá'í students enrolled in autumn 2006 were expelled throughout the course of the following academic year.

In addition to pressure on universities, the raids on BIHE have continued as well, with May 2011 marking the most recent attack by Iranian government forces. Coordinated raids were conducted simultaneously throughout the country on the homes of individuals involved with the Institute. Thirty-nine households were extensively searched with personal belongings confiscated. Nineteen individuals were arrested—all of whom were professors and administrators of BIHE. Seven of these nineteen individuals were sentenced to extended prison terms simply for providing an education to those who had been deprived of that right.

There has been growing concern internationally for the plight of the Bahá'ís in Iran, with both state and non-state actors pressuring the Iranian government to cease its campaign of persecution. Desmond Tutu, Romeo Dallaire, Ban Ki-moon, as well as former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy are a few of the many notable defenders of human rights who have stepped forward to decry the treatment of Bahá'í community. Universities across the globe have also stepped forward to support BIHE by recognizing the degrees awarded to graduates of the Institute. Queen's University is one such school, and as a result, a number of BIHE graduates have succeeded in completing their PhD at the university. One of Queens’ current students, Saba, completed her Undergraduate and Master's degree through the Bahá'í Institute for Higher Education. She is currently in the process of completing her PhD in Neuroscience here at Queen's, and has agreed to share her story.

INTERVIEW
How did you learn about BIHE?
The Bahá'í community is a small and very organized one. People receive the news both via official ways, meaning announcements through Feasts [Bahá'í community gathering], and word of mouth. By the time I wanted to apply to BIHE though, it was not a new thing anymore, but a norm for Iranian Bahá'í students.

What was your experience like during your time as an undergraduate student at BIHE? 
I think the experience has been unique in many ways, both in the difficulties and the blessings. Because we didn’t have the suitable locations or equipment, our classes would be held in the living room of one of the students. We simply couldn’t afford to have classes more than six times a semester, which meant that the classes were only for question/answer rather than teaching. On the other hand we were blessed with an attitude of love and support that usually bonds the members of an oppressed group. 

What course material did you cover? 
For most of the courses we used the materials used in North American universities to keep our standards comparable to theirs. Some of these resources were actually found in bookstores and other public shops, but many of them were not, and these latter ones were purchased by BIHE staff and were mailed to Iran. We would oftentimes end up sharing the books among ourselves.

Who were the teachers/professors? What were their qualifications?
Until 2005, the instructors were mainly the Bahá'í former professors who had been expelled from the universities after the Revolution. Some of them were physicians whose job wasn’t really teaching in a university, but they had the knowledge in their fields. A few of the instructors were Muslims who wished to help the Institute. In 2005, the Institute started to take a new approach, namely using the opportunity for distant learning through the online education facilities, which paved the way for a huge number of professors around the world to start helping BIHE.

What were the risks involved with being a professor, student, administrator associated with BIHE?
The main risk has always been imprisonment. For many, this has already happened and there are still many professors and administrators in jail. For hosts of the classes, there has also been a risk of having their property confiscated. This has happened a number of times with regards to our “labs” which had to be held in set locations and obviously couldn’t be moved.

Did you feel that the course material you studied was at the standard of most institutions of higher education?
When I was in my undergrad, I used to compare our coursework to that of the students in regular universities of Iran, whenever I would get the chance. The cases were limited so I cannot make a general judgement, but I had the impression that we were doing a more difficult job. 
Here, I have never taken a [undergraduate] course, so I cannot really compare.

How have you found the transition from attending BIHE for both your undergraduate degree as well as your Master's degree to Queen's University?
As stated, BIHE didn't even have a campus! Forget about labs, offices, classrooms, etc. I have, however, experienced being on a real campus before coming to Queen’s University, at Lyon, France, where I visited the lab of my Master’s supervisor for a couple of months. I have also been into regular universities of Iran, secretly, attending the classes by asking the professor’s permissions and telling them that I was not a student (I officially wasn’t!) and was just eager to attend, and it would work sometimes.
But this is the first physically existing university that I belong to, that I can get in without needing a friend coming and signing a “Guest’s Entrance permission” form on my behalf—Iran’s universities are very regulated and you are not allowed into campus, which is surrounded by walls, without being associated with the institution—that I can walk through without worrying about being stopped and sent out.

What were some of the unique experiences or opportunities you were exposed to as a student of BIHE?
I guess there were many. One of the primary experiences was experiencing all the devotion and love that came about from sharing the difficulties and successes with my classmates. University life can become harsh at times, and you can easily find your instructor being unreasonably demanding or even unkind. But even given all this, there were moments that you would be impressed by the amount of love and support that they would invest in their work. 
My supervisor during my Master’s hosted me at her home for the duration of my stay  there, paid for my travel expenses, and helped me with all the process of getting an entry visa for France. All just to give me a chance to experience working in her lab and have my thesis defence with a jury from her department—BIHE didn’t have any other experts in her field, except herself—as well as presenting my poster at a conference held in her city. 
One of my professors who lived in Toronto, which is 8 hours behind Tehran, where I was, had to get up at 5:00 a.m. once every week to have classes with us before she went to work. It was a precious moment for me when I came to Canada and could hug her and see her, after having heard only her voice for years. Studying at BIHE has developed a strong sense of appreciation in me for everything that makes life much more beautiful.

How has BIHE changed in recent years?
BIHE started as a small group of people dedicated to providing education for those who were deprived of it. Now, it has grown to an Institute with over a thousand students whose goals for education are not limited to just uplifting their personal life situations. BIHE has recently set a more specific direction for its future, and it is contributing to the socio-economic development of Iran. This has made some huge changes to the dynamics of the institute in several ways. 
First, because this new model requires a lot of interaction with the Iranian society at large, it increases the risks that the Institute faces. Second, because the goals have a more social perspective, the attitude of service and sacrifice inside the Institute has intensified, which can sometimes become exhausting. Third, because of the nature of the immediate demands of society, the focus of the Institute might turn into more practical aspects of knowledge, rather than more theoretical approaches. 

Is there any other information that you think that readers of this publication should know? 
These alterations to the Institute's structure and programs have increased the risks for individuals associated with BIHE. Now more than ever they need the support of organizations and people in order to continue their work in providing education to those whose rights have been removed, and contributing to the advancement of society.

Keep in touch with your university's Campus Association for Bahá'í Studies (CABS) group for updates on campus events to support the Bahá'ís in Iran. 

If You Love Me: HPV Vaccination for Males

Allan Jone
McMaster University

Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) is a sexually transmitted disease which is the major cause of cervical cancer. The World Health Organization estimates that 500 000 women suffer from cervical cancer annually. HPV vaccines are available and have proven to be safe and effective for both sexes as a viable means of intervention. Given that the main burden of HPV-related diseases is attributed to women because of cervical cancer, why does the public health vaccination policies target the opposite sex?

Although HPV infection in males does not lead to cervical cancer, it can still act as a transmission vector. Academics Zimet and Rosenthal have argued for the inclusion of males in HPV vaccination programs. Summarized in their review, the support of male HPV vaccination cites six fundamental reasons:

(1) Female-only vaccination will not protect men who have sex with men from HPV and HPV-related diseases; (2) the fastest way to achieve the greatest protection for females from cervical cancer and its precursors is to vaccinate males as well as females; (3) vaccinating males is a more equitable public health policy and recognizes that both genders contribute to the transmission of HPV; (4) vaccination of males may be more acceptable to some cultural groups than vaccinating females; (5) genital warts and HPV-related cancers in males represent costly and emotionally burdensome conditions that can be prevented more expediently by vaccinating both males and females; and (6) historically, implementation of risk-based (or gender-based) vaccination policies have been less effective and more confusing to the public. 

These reasons create a logical argument towards expanding and encouraging public health policy to target male HPV vaccination. However, money is most often a central consideration when making changes to health systems. Current literature proposes that HPV vaccination in males is less cost-effective than large-scale HPV vaccinations campaigns for females. Other studies, however, rebut that current methodologies used to calculate cost-effectiveness calculations do not capture the best measure of health outcomes. Consequently, the supporting data is not conclusive enough to dismiss male HPV vaccination as neither economically viable nor advantageous for public health.

Unless consensus is achieved within the research community regarding the cost-effectiveness of male HPV vaccination, an economic argument will remain elusive. Keeping some of Zimet and Rosenthal ‘s aforementioned ideas in mind, let’s take another look at the situation.

The transmission of HPV requires at least one infectious partner in a sexual relationship between two or more people. If two people are entering into a relationship, they have a mutual responsibility to protect their partner and themselves. The current media does not appropriately communicate the idea of a shared burden to the public, but rather publicizes HPV as a female disease because of its high correlation to cervical cancer. As a consequence, women not only bear a high proportion of the physical burden but bear the brunt of the social burden as well. It is troubling to see health systems take such a narrow-minded stance towards HPV vaccination and control. I want to draw a comparison between the achievements of gender equality with HPV vaccination policy. Issues of gender equality, similar to HPV, often disproportionately affect females. 

The recognition that males have an equal role to play in reducing gender equality has influenced a fundamental change in the way society perceives this problem. Why shouldn’t we extend that same collaborative atmosphere, found in gender equality, towards HPV prevention and control through the promotion of an equitable public health policy that encourages the vaccination of both sexes? At the end of the day, HPV affects both men and women. Neglecting to vaccinate males ignores one side of the problem and creates a bias towards women in society’s perception of HPV.

And so, if you love the person you’re with or you anticipate to be with, whether you are male or female in a heterosexual, homosexual, or other type of relationship, perhaps it’s time to shift the paradigm and face HPV as a collective entity.

The Cost of Violence


Arnav Agarwal
McMaster University

US$9 trillion is the estimated size of the economic impact we would have experienced, had the world been completely peaceful in 2011. While the world become more peaceful in 2011 for the first time since 2009 according to the Global Peace Index, it is hard to ignore how much of the job is left to be done. From a Canadian perspective, a rise in the rankings to being identified as the fourth most peaceful country globally is a positive sign, leaving only Iceland, Denmark and New Zealand ahead of us. However, the index, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, brings to light far more than the relative rankings of these countries in terms of their peacefulness: ranking the cost of violence.



How large is the potential impact of a completely peaceful world? Some of the largest threats on a global scale include climate change, poverty and economic instability. The estimated US $9 trillion is reported to be equivalent to the size of the German and Japanese economies combined, the former ranked as having the fifth largest GDP and the latter as having the third largest GDP globally in terms of purchasing power parity as of 2012. Furthermore, the amount is easily able to cover the entire amount allocated to deal with the European sovereign debt crisis with the European Financial Stability Facility.

Insight into the imbalance in resources allocated violent ends and those allocated for peace highlights a significant area of concern as well. Encompassing over one hundred and ninety member states, the United Nations provides an international forum and promotes progress in human rights and living standards through various programs and funds. The UN Millennium Development Goals seek to confront various global challenges, including the establishment of universal primary education, halving extreme poverty levels, and the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. 

The regular budget of the organization of the U.N. is reported to be nearly $1.9 billion annually. Drawing approximately half of its annual total expenditures from the voluntary contributions of its member states. Its annual expenditure of $15 billion on peacekeeping missions, programmes, funds and specialized agencies could easily be covered by the $1 trillion in annual world military expenditures. This would pay for the U.N. system for sixty-seven years! A quick calculation on the potential impact of a complete reduction in violence yields staggering results as well: over six hundred years of the U.N. system’s expenditures are covered with nine trillion dollars.

It is evident that a reduction in violence carries with it an economic impact of great significance, but bringing an end to violence on a global scale does not happen overnight. The first step to embracing a peaceful world is realizing how much of it is left to unlock and explore by fueling efforts to live in harmony rather than to live apart. While a 100% reduction might be a mile away, even a 25% reduction in violence is reported to have an estimated economic impact of $2.25 trillion. We may be ranked as the fourth most peaceful nation, but the paradox lies in our obliviousness to how, as a planet, we are losing exactly what we’re fighting over. Knowing the impact of our actions is the first step to changing perspectives globally on nurturing a united world and making change happen: after all, every domino effect begins with a single domino.


French Aspirations in the Mali Campaign

Omeed Hasan
Queen's University

As French and Malian troops entered Doutenza and Diabaly, a feeling of uncertainty looms amidst the landlocked republic's population. For the 16 million Malians, the duration and outcome of the current French military campaign seems rather hazy, with a very real potential for a drawn out military conflict. French initiatives under Francois Hollande's leadership were publicly stated as being short-term in nature. However, France's historical ties to Northwest Africa (Maghreb) coupled with their ambition to play the role of a more potent conciliator in global affairs may indicate otherwise—France could seek to reestablish its military and political might over its once colonial territories.



By engaging the Islamist fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad(MNLA) in the newly declared Azawad region, forces from France, Mali, and various West African states are effectively establishing a new front line against the Al-Qaeda off shoot in the Islamic Maghreb. This indicates France’s willingness to take a leading role in the new global war on terror. 

The successful acquisition of the northern Kidal, Gao, and Timbouctou regions of Mali by the MNLA and their allies was a significant development for the Al Qaeda, specifically Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, since it effectively established a new safe haven and potential base for operations. It was a collaborative military effort was between Tuareg fighters, who had been battle-hardened from the preceding Libyan conflict, and the Islamist fighters of Ansar al-Din. The two factions proved to be dominant over the pro-government Mali forces. Territory that was formerly a hotspot for European tourists is now a cradle for Islamic fundamentalism within the region. Rapid advancements were made that led to a de-facto north-south division of Mali by the end of March of 2012. Under the auspices of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the United States sponsored a counter terrorism training program for the Mali government, yet these efforts proved no match for the rebel forces. 

With the looming threat of the Islamist coalition would pushing onwards to Bamako, Mali’s capital city, it was a race against time for the French to ensure the entirety of geographic Mali remains under control of government forces.  Disrupting rebel supplies with airstrikes, while training West African and Malian troops to overtake the brunt of the day-to-day skirmishes. The reality of the expansion of a Sharia law further into the historical French Colonial Empire caused distress in Paris. 

The combat phase was initiated as French Mirage fighter planes began sorties over Mali on January 11, 2013 to eliminate a column of mobile rebel forces in central Mali, ending a 9 month long unchallenged Islamist rule in the Azawad region. This was the opening act of an asymmetric military campaign that was widely understood amongst the international community to only last a few weeks in duration. 
The short-term objectives are to prevent any further southerly territorial advancement by the MNLA. In this respect, France has proven itself successful by swiftly establishing its presence, as well as reviving a crippled Malian army. Long-term objectives are attempting a smooth and efficient transfer of the burden of the fight to Malian and West African troops under the ECOWAS umbrella. Although no direct military assistance from France’s European Union counterparts was given towards achieving the objectives the campaign, support shown through diplomatic and financial channels. 

The overwhelming firepower and technological advantage the French led coalition possesses over the MNLA has created the possibility of a scenario where guerilla forces will attempt to regroup over the Mauritanian border, allowing for pockets of conflict to emerge from the South and West.  A key development is that Islamist strongholds were taken out in the city of Gao, with Malian authorities claiming that this confrontation resulted in the death of 60 militants. This is one of a string of sobering events that have severely impeded the efforts of the Islamists of Azawad to create a command and control region for Jihadist operations.

There is a common misconception that majority of land in Mali will not yield significant strategic value for France in the future. France has steadily maintained its business pursuits in the former colonies, but has recently been under heavy competition from China, India, Germany, and the United States. In the same period where China’s proportion of imports into Africa grew from 3.4% to 12.5%, the French figures plummeted to 8.9% from 16.2%. The competition to win over West African nations’ allegiances for commercial interests may be giving France extra incentive to intervene in Mali. Mali has great potential in the oil and gas sector, although it requires a serious initiative to develop an adequate infrastructure that will be needed to effectively extract the oil and gas to enter the global markets. On top of this oil and gas potential, gold and uranium deposits remain scattered throughout Mali. 

In conflicts of this nature, it is the most marginalized within the society that will ultimately pay the price. The Malians have experienced recent suffering in the form of severe food shortages in this previous year— the military campaign may exacerbate the acute humanitarian crisis. The resulting pre-invasion displacement figures have been estimated 229,000 domestically displaced persons, with 147,000 fleeing into neighboring states, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees.

Francois Hollande’s ensuing decisions come at a time that represent a critical crossroad in French foreign policy, as the previous decade was spent trying to reduce the military impression on the African continent. As nations in French West Africa started to gain independence in the 1960’s onwards, the French were diligent in solidifying defense agreements with their former colonies, in order to maintain a military presence in the region. The demilitarization over the last decade was seen in the form of an unprecedented closing military bases.  In late 2012, Hollande conveyed with certain degree of conviction to lawmakers in Senegal that no combat troops would be dispatched to counter Islamist forces in the Azawad region. With 2500 newly arrived French troops, there is clearly an incongruence between Hollande’s rhetoric and actions in this situation. A broad initiative to combat Islamist fighters may very well coincide with neocolonial aspirations of the French Republic.



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