Queen's University
As French and Malian troops entered Doutenza and Diabaly, a feeling of uncertainty looms amidst the landlocked republic's population. For the 16 million Malians, the duration and outcome of the current French military campaign seems rather hazy, with a very real potential for a drawn out military conflict. French initiatives under Francois Hollande's leadership were publicly stated as being short-term in nature. However, France's historical ties to Northwest Africa (Maghreb) coupled with their ambition to play the role of a more potent conciliator in global affairs may indicate otherwise—France could seek to reestablish its military and political might over its once colonial territories.
By engaging the Islamist fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad(MNLA) in the newly declared Azawad region, forces from France, Mali, and various West African states are effectively establishing a new front line against the Al-Qaeda off shoot in the Islamic Maghreb. This indicates France’s willingness to take a leading role in the new global war on terror.
The successful acquisition of the northern Kidal, Gao, and Timbouctou regions of Mali by the MNLA and their allies was a significant development for the Al Qaeda, specifically Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, since it effectively established a new safe haven and potential base for operations. It was a collaborative military effort was between Tuareg fighters, who had been battle-hardened from the preceding Libyan conflict, and the Islamist fighters of Ansar al-Din. The two factions proved to be dominant over the pro-government Mali forces. Territory that was formerly a hotspot for European tourists is now a cradle for Islamic fundamentalism within the region. Rapid advancements were made that led to a de-facto north-south division of Mali by the end of March of 2012. Under the auspices of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the United States sponsored a counter terrorism training program for the Mali government, yet these efforts proved no match for the rebel forces.
With the looming threat of the Islamist coalition would pushing onwards to Bamako, Mali’s capital city, it was a race against time for the French to ensure the entirety of geographic Mali remains under control of government forces. Disrupting rebel supplies with airstrikes, while training West African and Malian troops to overtake the brunt of the day-to-day skirmishes. The reality of the expansion of a Sharia law further into the historical French Colonial Empire caused distress in Paris.
The combat phase was initiated as French Mirage fighter planes began sorties over Mali on January 11, 2013 to eliminate a column of mobile rebel forces in central Mali, ending a 9 month long unchallenged Islamist rule in the Azawad region. This was the opening act of an asymmetric military campaign that was widely understood amongst the international community to only last a few weeks in duration.
The short-term objectives are to prevent any further southerly territorial advancement by the MNLA. In this respect, France has proven itself successful by swiftly establishing its presence, as well as reviving a crippled Malian army. Long-term objectives are attempting a smooth and efficient transfer of the burden of the fight to Malian and West African troops under the ECOWAS umbrella. Although no direct military assistance from France’s European Union counterparts was given towards achieving the objectives the campaign, support shown through diplomatic and financial channels.
The overwhelming firepower and technological advantage the French led coalition possesses over the MNLA has created the possibility of a scenario where guerilla forces will attempt to regroup over the Mauritanian border, allowing for pockets of conflict to emerge from the South and West. A key development is that Islamist strongholds were taken out in the city of Gao, with Malian authorities claiming that this confrontation resulted in the death of 60 militants. This is one of a string of sobering events that have severely impeded the efforts of the Islamists of Azawad to create a command and control region for Jihadist operations.
There is a common misconception that majority of land in Mali will not yield significant strategic value for France in the future. France has steadily maintained its business pursuits in the former colonies, but has recently been under heavy competition from China, India, Germany, and the United States. In the same period where China’s proportion of imports into Africa grew from 3.4% to 12.5%, the French figures plummeted to 8.9% from 16.2%. The competition to win over West African nations’ allegiances for commercial interests may be giving France extra incentive to intervene in Mali. Mali has great potential in the oil and gas sector, although it requires a serious initiative to develop an adequate infrastructure that will be needed to effectively extract the oil and gas to enter the global markets. On top of this oil and gas potential, gold and uranium deposits remain scattered throughout Mali.
In conflicts of this nature, it is the most marginalized within the society that will ultimately pay the price. The Malians have experienced recent suffering in the form of severe food shortages in this previous year— the military campaign may exacerbate the acute humanitarian crisis. The resulting pre-invasion displacement figures have been estimated 229,000 domestically displaced persons, with 147,000 fleeing into neighboring states, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees.
Francois Hollande’s ensuing decisions come at a time that represent a critical crossroad in French foreign policy, as the previous decade was spent trying to reduce the military impression on the African continent. As nations in French West Africa started to gain independence in the 1960’s onwards, the French were diligent in solidifying defense agreements with their former colonies, in order to maintain a military presence in the region. The demilitarization over the last decade was seen in the form of an unprecedented closing military bases. In late 2012, Hollande conveyed with certain degree of conviction to lawmakers in Senegal that no combat troops would be dispatched to counter Islamist forces in the Azawad region. With 2500 newly arrived French troops, there is clearly an incongruence between Hollande’s rhetoric and actions in this situation. A broad initiative to combat Islamist fighters may very well coincide with neocolonial aspirations of the French Republic.
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